Configuration

Everything is an environment variable. The full table with types and defaults is in the environment reference; this page explains the ones with consequences.

Connecting

SMTP_HOST, SMTP_USER and SMTP_PASSWORD are the account. SMTP_PORT follows SMTP_TLS unless you set it.

SMTP_TLS	Default port	Behaviour
starttls	587	Connects in the clear and requires the upgrade. The default.
implicit	465	TLS from the first byte.
none	25	No encryption, ever.

starttls requires the upgrade rather than attempting it. That distinction is the whole point: left to a library default, STARTTLS is used when the server offers it and skipped when it does not — so an attacker who can strip the capability from the server's greeting gets a cleartext session carrying your password, and nothing says a word. Here that is a failed connection.

none means none, not "encrypt if it happens to be offered". A mode whose behaviour depends on what the peer advertises is a mode nobody can reason about. Against a non-loopback host it prints a warning.

SMTP_INSECURE_TLS=true accepts self-signed certificates. It is scoped to this server's own connection and never touches process-wide TLS verification — but prefer a proper internal CA.

The sender

SMTP_FROM is the only sender this server will use, in either form:

SMTP_FROM='person@example.net'
SMTP_FROM='Your Name <person@example.net>'

There is no from tool parameter, and adding one is out of scope. A model that can choose its own sender can write in a colleague's name, and the message that results is indistinguishable from one they wrote. The envelope sender is the bare address out of this value, so SPF and DKIM line up with what the recipient sees.

Turning sending on

SMTP_ALLOW_SEND=true
SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS='@example.net,partner@example.org'

SMTP_ALLOW_SEND accepts exactly the string true. Anything else — TRUE, 1, yes — leaves sending off, because a variable that guards an outbound channel should not be permissive about what counts as consent.

SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS is required when sending is on. Entries are:

Entry	Matches
@example.net	any address at that domain, and not at a subdomain
person@example.net	exactly that address
*	anyone — must be the only entry

A domain rule does not cover its subdomains. Subdomain matching is the kind of convenience that turns one allowlisted domain into whatever anyone can register underneath it; if you want @mail.example.net, name it.

* cannot be combined with other entries. Together they read as "these, plus a wildcard somebody forgot to remove", and the person deleting the real entries later believes they are tightening the list. They are not — * already allowed everything.

Malformed entries stop the server rather than matching nothing, and comparison is done on the bytes as written: a homoglyph domain simply fails to match, which is the direction this has to fail in.

Limits

Variable	Default	What it bounds
SMTP_MAX_RECIPIENTS	10	distinct addresses across To, Cc and Bcc in one message
SMTP_MAX_SENDS_PER_HOUR	20	messages in a sliding hour
SMTP_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES	10485760	the composed message, after encoding
SMTP_MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES	5242880	one attachment, before encoding

The hourly cap is held in memory and resets when the server restarts. That is a deliberate trade: a counter in a file would need locking, would drift when two clients run the server at once, and would turn a corrupt state file into a server that refuses to send at all. Read it as a blast-radius limit, not as a quota.

Attachments

Attachments are unavailable until SMTP_ATTACHMENT_DIR names a directory. Callers then name a file inside it — a plain filename, no path — and everything else is refused: separators, .., leading dots, symlinks, extensions outside SMTP_ATTACHMENT_TYPES, executable extensions, and anything whose leading bytes say it is a binary regardless of what it is called.

The default type list is documents and images. Two things are deliberately not on it and have to be written into SMTP_ATTACHMENT_TYPES by hand: text/html, because an HTML file opens in a browser with none of a mail client's restrictions and none of the sanitising the HTML part of a message gets — the phishing shape called HTML smuggling — and application/zip, because an archive passes the magic-byte check on its own bytes and can carry an executable the check never sees.

The directory is the only source of the path. A caller cannot choose which part of your disk gets mailed out.

Signature and audit

SMTP_SIGNATURE is appended below the standard -- delimiter, which is what makes mail clients hide it when quoting a reply.

SMTP_AUDIT_LOG names a file that receives a copy of every audit line. Those lines always go to stderr; the file is what makes the record outlive the terminal the client was started in. It holds the recipients, the subject, the Message-ID and the size — never the body.

Refused sends are written down too, marked outcome=refused, declined or token_rejected, with the recipients and the subject that were asked for. A session that is being steered mostly produces refusals — an address off the allowlist, a token that did not match — and those lines are what shows it was being steered.

Turning the approval dialog off

Every send asks a person through MCP elicitation before the message leaves. ELICITATION=false takes it to the two-call token instead. It does not remove the guard; there is no setting in which a message goes out unannounced.

The variable deliberately carries no SMTP_ prefix, which means it reaches every MCP server in the same environment — and this is the server where that costs the most. Unlike SMTP_ALLOW_SEND, a value it does not recognise stops the server rather than failing off. See Asking a person.

Choosing the tools that load

SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS decides what is registered; SMTP_DENY_TOOLS is subtracted from it. Both take comma-separated tool names, or a prefix with a single trailing *.

SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential
SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS='get_server_info,preview_mail'
SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS='send_*'
SMTP_DENY_TOOLS=forward_mail

essential selects a curated five: get_server_info, validate_recipients, preview_mail, send_mail and reply_mail. forward_mail is left out on purpose — forwarding carries somebody else's content and attachments outward, which is the call that most deserves to be switched on deliberately.

A filtered tool is not built. It does not appear in tools/list and a call answers "not found", exactly like a sending tool while SMTP_ALLOW_SEND is unset. Nothing is advertised and then refused.

An entry matching no tool aborts startup and lists the real names. That is louder than it sounds and it is the point: a tool quietly missing from tools/list is invisible, and nobody traces an absence back to an environment variable. A pattern that matches only sending tools while sending is off is a warning rather than an error — a pattern is a template, not a claim about one tool — but an exact name in that position is fatal, because somebody typed it believing it was exposed.